James wrote:Sure, the West was involved in the fundamental divide behind Euromaidan, but so was Russia. Geopolitical interests all around played an integral role in the grievances of Euromaidan protesters.
Alright, care to contextualise this equivalence somewhat? Or at all? No? Then allow me.
Ukraine was an absolute finical wreck at the beginning of this year. In despite of its industrial and agricultural outputs, it was racking up insane internal and trade deficits. I don't think anyone sane disputes this. But what you won't hear from any quarter of the Western media are the reasons why this was the case. The European Union was
contributing directly to both of these problems by pursuing unfair trade relations with the Ukraine and predatorily pricing out its domestic industries. At this point, Russia sold gas to the Ukraine at a very reasonable price, but this part of Ukraine's trade deficit was counterbalanced by a reciprocal trade in electricity. Russia was not pricing Ukrainian firms out of the market.
But the situation remained, that in the immediate term, the Ukraine needed an immediate infusion of cash for deficit relief and investment. The EU Association Agreement - to which Yanukovych was
not originally opposed, by the way -
did not provide any of that. It was a bum deal. Anyone and everyone - including
Sean Guillory (a well-known Russia watcher, blogger and EE scholar, and one not particularly fond of Putin) - who read the EU Association Agreement thought it was a bum deal, which would make an already bad situation worse for Ukraine, but make a few wealthy western Europeans even wealthier. The language used by
Joszef Borocz was 'grossly asymmetrical'. And here is what he says about the structural preconditions the EU Association Agreement would have mandated for Ukraine's economy:
Joszef Borocz wrote:So, when we see a reference to adoption (or, as in the case of Ukraine, “approximation”) of the acquis communautaire, we need to remember that the acquis is, by definition, a neoliberal tool, designed to increase the global sway of transnational capital based in western Europe. That’s what it is, no less, no more.
When I look at the EU's economic interference in the Ukraine, I see a practiced, calculating and utterly ruthless colonial power at work, which cloaks the avarice of its corporate and bankster overlords in nice-sounding language like 'freedom' and 'democracy' and 'civilisation' and 'rule of law'. When I look at Russia's interference, political and economic, in the Ukraine, I see a self-interested regional power which feels its borders are threatened, and seeks first to placate a (grantedly incredibly corrupt) neighbouring government, with which it feels a certain cultural and historic kinship, at a particularly high cost to itself. Russia
marked down a massive amount of debt that the Ukraine owed it ($15 billion dollars), and reduced the price of gas still further to ease the trade deficit, in the wake of the association crisis. So when you say:
James wrote:And there's nothing at face value wrong with wanting the country to lean pro-Europe or pro-Russia—it's a reasonable thing for a country wedged between both interests (something only to scale as the world becomes more interconnected) to be concerned about. But in terms of external influence, I'm not sure how you can cast the blame in one direction.
You may think you sound reasonable and even-handed with language like this, but to me you come off as someone who doesn't take a lot of interest in the bigger story, but is eager to cast judgement and blame on Russia all the same.
If you want to take a look at a country which
really knows how to play the game Yanukovych was trying to play, and which has been successful enough at it that its president hasn't needed to put down significant amounts of foreign-funded astroturf resistance, you need only to look at
the Big Bread here. I lived long enough in this country to have a passing familiarity with its long history of engagement with an imperially-minded Russia and an imperially-minded China, and to know that the game Yanukovych was trying to play is one which it's possible to win.
But Viktor Fedorovych tried to treat the EU with kid gloves, and he paid a very steep price for that miscalculation.
James wrote:And that downed plane—if you are certain that was Ukraine you've been reading one side of the story.
*golf clap*
Nice. Well-done indeed. I really love the personal accusation of my one-sided ignorance, by the way, particularly given your later 'let's endeavour to leave the personal characterisation out of this' tack. Ten points for
chutzpah right there. Good thing you're doing everything in your power to keep this conversation civil, right?
I've been reading
both sides of the story. But one side is looking less and less convincing to me, given their recent studied inaction. It strikes me that, given that the pro-Russian rebels willingly released the black boxes to what they consider to be a fair and neutral authority, and now that the Russian government is pressuring for their release to the public, that (were character witness a reliable thing at all on the international stage) these are not the actions of a manifestly guilty party. Accidentally-guilty? Still very much a possibility.
But the silence and the studied disinterest from the Western media is deafening.
It should be clear at least by now that the Western media didn't give a damn about those 300 people - except as a stick to beat Russia with. Or on a general 'if it bleeds, it leads' principle.
James wrote:Plenty of evidence points in the potential direction of pro-Russia activists as well, from reports of early celebration on the internet (a misunderstood target) up to access of the required weaponry. I wouldn't dare say in certainty that it was the pro-Russia militants, though, and a person suitably interested could be just as skeptical of Ukraine. We just don't have the information needed to be certain of it and it seems highly inappropriate to pretend that we do.
I have been saying this all along, that the official narrative from the State Department
needs to be questioned, that we
don't know anything substantive as yet, and that if we're wise, we would take stock of what both sides were saying. I have been saying all along that we need to take Malaysia's tack - they lost the most and have the most reason to be outraged, yet have declined to make any judgement as yet on who is to blame.
Yet when I linked stories on Facebook - even ones from non-Russian news sources - that challenged the idea that Russia
had to be guilty, you (and only you, James) took umbrage at it and accused me of spreading Russian propaganda.
James wrote:If Russia wants an independent self-sufficient Ukraine
Which they don't, and which I never pretended they did. They want a pliant buffer state.
But NATO and the EU don't want an independent, self-sufficient Ukraine either. The EU wants cheap labour and another market for goods from Western European firms. NATO wants another willing vassal to park its missiles and fighter jets in and aim them at Russia. That's all.
James wrote:I instead believe it is very reasonable to interpret what Russia has done, and what Russia is doing, as taking steps to either absorb Ukraine, absorb what they can of Ukraine, or convert Ukraine's government back over to something that is more pro-Russia, can be controlled by Russia, or do that to whatever of Ukraine cannot be absorbed.
Once again, I think you are coming at this from a very narrow perspective which falls apart once your angle changes.
First order, Russia does want a pro-Russia Ukraine. And it wants its one warm saltwater base facing West. Like I said - pliant buffer state is the end goal for Russia in Ukraine. It was
to be expected that Russia would take steps to defend Sevastopol (which is Russian and always has been Russian, even post-Ukrainian statehood in 1991). The decision to give Crimea to Ukraine was a purely political one typical of the top Soviet leadership and was a way for Khrushchev to reward his loyal cronies. There is no independent reason to believe that what we saw with the Crimean referendum wasn't actually the will of the Crimean electorate in action, and a Soviet-era blunder of the divide-and-conquer type reversing itself.
EDIT:
To be clear (and I still feel it is unfair that I have to point this out every single time Crimea is brought up), I don't think two wrongs make a right. I think Russia put itself in the wrong the moment Russian boots set foot outside Sevastopol. But that shouldn't mean we ignore the history of the place, or the current situation, or the feelings of the people who actually live there.But I don't think there is any indication
at all that Putin wants anything more, if we are looking at this from a blunt, self-interested realist perspective. Novorossiya is vital for Ukraine's economy, but it doesn't add anything to Russia's. We can already see that territorially speaking, it is difficult to hold onto and defend. If anything, Putin wants to see a ceasefire, since that takes international pressure
off of him. And I think Putin realises better than anyone else that a Ukraine minus Novorossiya would be much more difficult to bring back into the fold, as it were. Taking direct action now - even with special ops forces - makes a pro-Russian Ukraine more difficult to achieve in the long run. It would seem to be the Russian
electorate, on the other hand, which sympathises with the people of Novorossiya (of whom over half a million are now seeking refuge within Russia's borders), and which wants to see Putin take bolder action there. This is why I tend to doubt the stories of a 'Russian invasion' of Ukraine (though not, I should note, the stories of Russian veterans and mercenaries going to fight in Novorossiya).
James wrote:Do you happen to agree that Russia has played a strong role in creating opportunity for that instability? Or that it is not excuse for Russia's invasion? I expect that you don't.
I've given you my analysis above. Under Yanukovych, Russia
had no reason to create instability in the Ukraine.
The EU, on the other hand, had plenty of reasons.
Now, under Poroshenko, the reverse is true. But Poroshenko could not have come to power without the EU
first creating opportunities for instability, with the tools of right-wing racist and extremist thugs ready to hand. Downplay them all you like, but the EU could not have ousted Yanukovych without the Nazis' help.
And you're right - I don't look for any excuse to cry wolf about 'invasions' that never seem to actually happen. Lord knows there are enough wannabe heroes in NATO, and in the do-something brigades here at home, doing just that, without me joining them.