Dong Zhou wrote:I asked about "I get the theory but source on such accurate information of an an army in a way one isn't involved in happening in 3 kingdoms?", Zhuge Ke using spies to look at his opponents near by defences isn't the same as spies informing on a distant camapign and delivering accurate and timely reports on an army in the field's formations. In theory, I can see it but there isn't a single case of it happening coming up in the sgz or ZZTJ so can you back it up with a ource
I haven't seen the exact comment within the sgz so no idea if historians there did question it, in Generals of the South chapter 7 has Professor Rafe remark shows some scepticism in note 33
SGZ 2, 80; Fang, Chronicle I, 104, tells how Cao Pi heard of the manner Liu Bei had extended his encampments through the hill country, and forecast his defeat. Even if this anecdote is true, it is doubtful whether anyone foresaw such a catastrophic rout of the invaders
I doubt Liu Bei had somehow, in his long career, never fought in forested area's. Swamps? Cao Pi had shorter career and fought in better circumstances then Liu Bei and yet kept losing as a Cic. Liu Bei was a noted commander, Cao Pi never got that level of miliatry reputation.
and achieved what merit? Sure, he had dealt with local revolts well enough, his friendship is not relevant to his skill as a strategist. The generals who beat Cao Pi's forces just happened to all be unable to understand basics this one occasion in their entire careers? Nothing we have seen suggests Cao Pi was in such a situation with his court.
Fu Jia petition to Sima Shi
The rebels have set up beacons and watch towers; in this they are especially prudent, so that our spies cannot operate and our ears and eyes go uninformed. When the army lacks ears and eyes and is without detailed information, to proceed against a great danger with masses of troops would be merely trusting to luck for success. To try to win after the battle is joined is not the best of plans for preserving the army. To move the army forward and undertake extensive agricultural colonies is the only sage and reliable measure. Wang Chang, Hu Zun, and others might be ordered to occupy key positions and to act cautiously when they take any measure; then they should be ordered to proceed from their three different directions to seize the enemy’s fertile lands and make him return to his leaner lands. This is the first point. Second, with our army in front of the people, the enemy will not be able to plunder them. Third, along the nearest route we will bring such pressure to bear that surrenders will increase daily. Fourth, with the beacons and watch-towers being set up far away, their spies will not come to us. Fifth, as the rebels retreat, their system of beacons and watch-towers will be relaxed, so it will be easy for us to make progress with our agricultural colonies. Sixth, living in these places off public stores, our troops need not be bothered with transportation. Seventh, whenever opportunity is offered, we must launch our attack speedily. These seven points are the most urgent military considerations. If we do not take them in hand, the rebels will seize the advantage; if we do take them in hand, the advantage will be to the State. We cannot but take note of this.
Now with the camps and fortifications so close to each other, the respective strength of each side will be communicated to the other. Intelligence and courage will be displayed, skill or stupidity will be applied. By the action will be known the effectiveness or failure of the plans; by the contest will be known whether they were more than ample or inadequate. How is the reality of the enemy’s situation to be concealed from us?
Fu Jia mentioned that spies could record detailed information.
Whats wrong with accurate and timely reports again? Also, the spies reported Liu Bei camp location and set up. No 'field formations'.
It wasnt nearby defences.
Zhuge Ke of Wu had sent his spies afar to reconnoiter strategic points, intending to take Shouchun. The taifu (Sima Yi) led his troops into Shu, from which he intended to attack Zhuge Ke. The Sovereign of Wu was about to dispatch reinforcements when a geomantist held it to be unprofitable, so he transferred Zhuge Ke to Chaisang and stationed him there.
Afar. If Zhuge Ke spies can record strategic points, Cao Pi spies should have information on Liu Bei camp.
So no historian other than RDC seems to argue otherwise.
Than showed me where and when Liu Bei fought in swamps. Again, just because Bei choke once in his 60s doesnt mean Pi would choke too. And you dont need to be a better military commander to point out something in a book. Pi probably just had a better memory. Also, Liu Bei was not fond of studying while Cao Pi was a learned man of literature.
The Sun Wu generals were getting rekt. They were feeling frustrated at their general strategies. They were panicking at their general decisions. It was highly likely they could not make a calm decision in that environment which could explain why they could not spot Bei mistake. I was giving examples for Pi thing.
Liu Bei did nothing wrong.
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